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Pugsley: A Retributivist Argument Against Capital Punishment

A RETRIBUTIVIST ARGUMENT AGAINST
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
Robert A. Pugsley*
The issue of capital punishment is with us still, indeed more
than at any other time in the past decade. During the past four
years, no one has abstracted the arguments surrounding this ultimate sanction from the reality that gives rise to them. Since Janu-

ary 17, 1977,1 death has been a fact of life for the men and women
on death rows across this nation, 2 as well as for their families,

friends, keepers, and ultimately their executioners. The full range
of passions, rhetoric, and reasoned arguments are renewed each
time an execution is carried out. That is welcome, because death
should never become routine. The real threat lies in ennui, some
hint of which is already reflected in the mass media: News con-

cerning impending and completed executions is beginning to move
to the inside pages of the national dailies and into brief filler material on the networks' nightly news. 3 These events serve to remind
* Associate Professor of Law, SCALE (Southwestern's Conceptual Approach to
Legal Education) Program, Southwestern University School of Law. B.A., 1968, State
University of New York at Stony Brook; J.D., 1975, LL.M., 1977, New York University School of Law. I wish to thank Dr. Cathleen R. Cox, John Danisi, Professor Joel
Feinberg of the University of Arizona, and Professor David McKenzie of Berry
College (Mount Berry, Georgia) for their insightful and encouraging comments on
earlier drafts of the manuscript. An earlier draft of this Article was delivered to the
Interdisciplinary Conference on Capital Punishment, Georgia State University, Atlanta, Georgia, on April 19, 1980.
1. The execution of convicted murderer Gary Gilmore by a firing squad in Utah
on that date was the first use of capital punishment in the United States in almost a
decade. Since then, the ultimate sanction has been visited upon three other death
row inmates: John A. Spenkelink, in Florida, May 25, 1979; Jesse Bishop, in Nevada,
October 22, 1979; and Steven T. Judy, in Indiana, March 9, 1981. [1981] 1 DEATH
PENALTY REP. (NCCD) 26.
2. The prisoner count on death row is 750, spread over 30 states and the U.S.
military. Of this total, 742 are male, 8 are female; 290 are black, 396 are white. Id. at
27.
3. I predicted as much in an essay written on the occasion of Gilmore's execution. Pugsley, Reflections on January 17, 1977, 37 CHRISTIANrrY & CRIsIS 15-16
(1977). It should be noted, however, that if the death penalty continues to be employed with the relative infrequency that has characterized the past four years, indif-
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all society that several important questions concerning the legality
and morality of execution remain not merely unanswered, but in-

adequately explored. There are some arguments in support of the
death penalty which should no longer hold sway, if they ever did
-and others which, while plausible and superficially appealing, require closer inspection. It is to those related tasks that this Article
turns its attention.

The Article will primarily address questions concerning the
ethics of criminal punishment generally and of the death penalty-

an obviously unique punishment-in particular. The first section
suggests the central place such discussion occupies in the constitutional analysis of capital punishment, and the reasons a more thorough appreciation of these issues by both abolitionists and retentionists is therefore desirable.
The next section briefly considers the principal utilitarian
claim on behalf of capital punishment, that of deterrence, and ar-

gues that it is both an empirically insufficient and theoretically
unacceptable justification for the existence or imposition of capital
punishment. 4 I then review two reasons frequently offered in justiference by the media, and therefore the public, is less likely than if such practice
were to become routine.
The highly variable processes of selecting candidates for execution, coupled
with its infrequency, formed the primary basis upon which the United States Supreme Court decided in 1972 that capital punishment as then administered constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 240 (1972) (per curiam); id. at 309-10
(Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 312 (White, J., concurring). Four years after Furman,
the Court held that the death penalty is not per se violative of the eighth amendment, and it gave an outline of the procedures and criteria that would henceforth be
constitutionally required for the imposition of the ultimate sanction. Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188-95 (1976). Thus, infrequency of application is constitutionally irrelevant today; whereas a jurisdiction's selection method remains central.
So long as the latter passes constitutional muster, the small number of executions
may, with some plausibility, be advanced by the government as evidence of both a
reluctance to use the death penalty and also an appropriate degree of caution in its
application. Id. at 182. It should be noted, however, that the Court made clear that
each state's system would have to receive individual scrutiny. Id. at 195.
4. It is but one of utility's defects as a moral theory that, by its very terms, it is
critically dependent upon empirical measurement of the immeasurable-of happiness or suffering, pleasure or pain-for its valid employment. In the realm of criminal punishment, utility's two principal manifestations are deterrence and rehabilitation: The former requires the calibrated estimation of fear; the latter, the
determination that the offender has become certifiably "better." For a recent
discussion of the shortcomings of both of these putative justifications for criminal
punishment, see Pugsley, Retributivism: A Just Basis for Crimimal Sentences, 7
HOFsTRA L. REv. 379, 383-87, 391-97 (1979).
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fication of capital punishment which are mischaracterized as retributive: the channeling of vengeance that would otherwise result in

anarchy, and the demonstration and vindication of moral norms.
While both are very desirable accompaniments of retributive punishment, neither states the essence of the retributive justification of
punishment.

The main focus of the Article is the retributivist justification
for criminal punishment. I will outline the classical Kantian formu-

lation of retributivism and its traditional implication for capital pun-

ishment. 5 I propose a wholly different retributivist conclusion concerning capital punishment: one founded upon Kant's insights

concerning man's nature and fundamental worth, and arguably
more consistent with these insights than Kant's own rigidly literalist approach to execution.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRmiMEwoR

In the landmark case of Gregg v. Georgia,6 Justice Stewart's
plurality opinion rearticulated 7 the two-stage constitutional inquiry
for determining whether the challenged punishment-execution
-was per se violative of the eighth amendment's proscription
against cruel and unusual punishments. 8 First, is the death penalty
compatible with "the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society?" 9 Second and separate from the
first, does the punishment "[comport] with the basic concept of human dignity at the core of the [Eighth] Amendment?"' 0
The first question focuses upon available indicia of past and
contemporary attitudes concerning the retention and application of
a particular punishment. The plurality" and "hard-liners"' 2 alike
5. In the course of this discussion there will be occasion to comment on a recent retributively inspired defense of the death penalty. See W. BERNS, FOR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: CRIME AND THE MORALITY OF THE DEATH PENALTY (1979); note

43 infra and accompanying text.
6. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
7. This position was initially adopted by the Court in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.

86 (1958).
8. The eighth amendment provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S.
CONST. amend. VIII.
9. 428 U.S. at 173 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
10. Id. at 182 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. at 101).
11. For use of this terminology in this context, see Criminal Law, 1977 ANN.
SURVEY AM. L. 365, 366-67. The plurality, consisting of Justices Powell, Stewart, and

Stevens, upheld the death penalty in some circumstances, Gregg v. Georgia, 428
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refused to be bound by notions of what would count as "cruel and
unusual" in 1787, but rather held that the eighth amendment must
be "interpreted in a flexible and dynamic manner," 13 so that the
ban on barbarism "is not fastened to the obsolete, but may acquire
meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice."' 4 Such an approach certainly formed an important part of
the bases on which Justices Brennan 15 and Marshall16 in dissent
found the death penalty unconstitutional per se.
Under such an analysis, a strong presumption of validity attaches to any legislatively prescribed punishment because "the constitutional test is intertwined with an assessment of contemporary
standards and the legislative judgment weighs heavily in ascertaining such standards."' 17 This approach facilitates and endorses
two different positions in support of capital punishment which will
be considered in due course: the burden-of-proof argument advanced by certain proponents of deterrence theory;18 and the
expression-of-community-moral-outrage argument advanced by certain modem retributivists who accept and endorse at face value
what is self-described by the legislature as the considered moral
consensus of the community.19
The plurality asserted, however, that "public perceptions of
standards of decency with respect to criminal sanctions are not conclusive. A penalty must also accord with 'the dignity of man,'
which is the 'basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment.' "20
To this end, even widely popular punishments must be subjected
to independent judicial scrutiny so as to insure that "the sanction
imposed cannot be so totally without penological justification that it
U.S. at 168-87, but found mandatory sentencing procedures unconstitutional.
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 288-301 (1976).
12. The hard-liners, Justices White and Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger,
upheld the death sentences in the entire Gregg line of cases. See cases cited note 28

infra.
13. 428 U.S. at 171.
14. Id. (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910)).
15. Id. at 228 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
2382 296 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
16. 428 U.S. at 240-41 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
17. Id. at 175.
18. See, e.g., van den Haag, On Deterrence and the Death Penalty, 60 J. CRIM.
L.C. & P.S. 141 (1969). Contra, Bedau, Deterrence and the Death Penalty: A Reconsideration, 61 J. CmiM. L.C. & P.S. 539 (1970).
19. See note 42 infra and accompanying text.
20. 428 U.S. at 173 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. at 100).
21. Id. at 185.
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results in the gratuitous infliction of suffering." 21 Human dignity is
said to be offended when a punishment is "excessive," 2 2 that is,
when it involves "the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,"
or is "grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime." 2 3
These two aspects of the proportionality test are now constitutionally mandated2 4 and arguably apply to the amount of punishment,2 5 as well as to the kind of punishment. 26 Courts must consider the punishment, in relation to the gravity of offense, in the
abstract, and not with reference to its imposition on a particular
27
defendant in a specific case.
This second line of inquiry, in which the Court explicitly undertakes to examine a given penalty within the framework of penological theory, offers ample opportunity for the kind of discussion
that follows in this Article. In fact, the theory of retribution is erroneously characterized and inadequately considered by the plurality2 8 and the "hard-liners"2 9 alike. Justices Brennan and Marshall
can hardly be described as sympathetic to retribution, yet in their
respective opinions in Furman v. Georgia3 0 and Gregg31 both cap22. Id. at 173.
23. Id. (citations omitted).
24. E.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153
(1976).
25. Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974); In re
Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972). But see Rummel v.
Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980), where the Court held that, except in an egregious case,
courts should defer to the legislature's judgment on sentencing, and affirmed, on
eighth amendment grounds, a life sentence (with possibility of parole), pursuant to
Texas' recidivist statute for three property felonies totaling $229.11.
26. See, e.g., Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349 (1910) (corporal punishment); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (execution).
27. 428 U.S. at 173.
28. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 188-206 (plurality); Proffitt v. Florida, 428
U.S. 242, 247-60 (1976) (plurality); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 268-77 (1976) (plurality); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 302-05 (1976) (plurality); Roberts v.
Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 331-36 (1976) (plurality).
29. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 220-26 (White, J., concurring in the judgment,
joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J.); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. at 260-61
(White, J., concurring in the judgment, joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J.);
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. at 277-79 (White, J., concurring in the judgment, joined by
Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J.); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. at 306-07
(White, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J.); Roberts v.
Louisiana, 428 U.S. at 344-50 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., Blackmun
and Rehnquist, J.J.). One of the hardliners, Justice Rehnquist, wrote a separate dissenting opinion in Woodson which addressed both substantive and procedural issues. 428 U.S. at 308-24 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
30. 408 U.S. 238, 304 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
31. 428 at 237 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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tured more of the theory's nuances than their brethren, though
the identity of interest between the
each ultimately failed to see
"essential dignity of man" 32 on which they would strike down the
death penalty, and the Kantian conception of individual worth on
which a retributivist can also argue for the death penalty's elimination. At the least, both Justices concluded 33 that execution is not
required by retribution, the central thesis of this Article.
Justice Stewart's plurality opinion in Gregg found capital punishment to be, in part, "an expression of society's moral outrage at
particularly offensive conduct," 34 and described the social channeling of the "instinct for retribution [which] is part of the nature
of man" 35 as "unappealing to many, but . . . essential in an ordered society that asks its citizens to rely on legal processes rather
than self-help to vindicate their wrongs." 36 The plurality wrongfully
assumed that retribution is an instinct and that its expression by
the state is therefore the rationalized adoption of an unthinking impulse. If it were only that, it would be shameful to elevate it to the

status of a "penological purpose" let alone a moral theory. As Justice Marshall argued in dissent, the "safety-valve" theory of punish37
ment is not truly retributive but essentially utilitarian.
The other related aspect of punishment which the plurality
linked with retribution is the reinforcement of shared moral and
social values. 38 This goal of moral pedagogy is by no means incompatible with retributivism, 39 but it is not-as Justice Marshall was
32. Id. at 229 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 239-41 (Marshall, J., dissenting); 408 U.S. at 304-05 (Brennan, J., concurring).
34. 428 U.S. at 183.
35. Id. (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 308 (Stewart, J., concurring)).
36. Id. The debate over "human nature" would carry us well beyond the scope
of this Article. It is sufficient to note here that one of the most distinguishing features about moral theories is their purposeful separation from blind or instinctual response to circumstance.
37. See id. at 238-39 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 183.
39. Indeed, such reaffirmation of moral values and concomitant strengthening
of social bonds should be a welcome effect of retributive punishment. See notes
64-66, 84-89 infra and accompanying text. But such results may not be regarded as,
or substituted for, the retributive justification of criminal punishment, namely, a
principled and proportionate response to the offender's deserts, without more. For a
careful discussion of the differences between vindication of a rule (and the value it
embodies), and retribution, see Mueller, Punishment, Corrections, and the Law, in
THE TASKS OF PENOLOGY 47, 56-60 (H. Perlman & T. Allington eds. 1969). For a
discussion of the "assurance problem" see J. BAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 270, 315
(1971).
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again the only member of the Court to point out-really retri-

butivist.40 It is, in fact, deterrent in nature. As paft of the theory

best known to Europeans as "general prevention," 41 it is basically
teleological (it purports to justify punishment as a means to a further end), and specifically utilitarian.
Because Justice Marshall implicitly accepted the conventional
understanding of retribution's harsh implications for criminal punishment, he explicitly rejected as violative of the eighth amendment the genuinely retributivist idea that a murderer could deserve death, and that the community might legitimately insist upon
imposing it for that reason alone-because the delivery of deserved
punishment is itself a moral good.42 As a retributivist, I (must) disagree with Justice Marshall's rejection of this approach to punishment.43 With his specific conclusion that retribution does not in
fact require the death penalty, however, I can and do agree.4 Further, I share his premise that, "[t]he mere fact that the community
demands the murderer's life in return for the evil he has done cannot sustain the death penalty 45 for reasons inherent in a moral
theory of retributivism as well as in the standard of constitutional
review proclaimed by the Court.
Justice Marshall stated that while retribution is important in
deciding who should receive punishment (the desert principle as
crucial link between punishment and justice), it is misplaced as a
40. 428 U.S. at 238-39 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
41. Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L.
REv. 949 (1966).

42. 428 U.S. at 239-41 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Public opinion about the contemporary acceptability of the death penalty is appropriately though not exclusively
used in the first stage of inquiry to assess whether execution meets "the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Id. at 173
(quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. at 101). If the same community opinion is then also
uncritically employed to identify and define the content of the penological purposes
according to which the Court must determine whether the death penalty "comports
with the basic concept of human dignity at the core of the [Eighth] Amendment," id.
at 182-i.e., whether it is a barbarous type of punishment, or disproportionate in relation to the severity of the crime-then the second prong of the test will have been
effectively stripped of its intended independence from the first, rendering its
rearticulation by the plurality a hollow exercise. The plurality has unfortunately but
obviously accepted this unreflective version of retributivism championed by, inter
alios, Professor Walter Berns in his recent book. W. BEaNS, supra note 5. Berns'
work was critically reviewed in Hughes, License to Kill, 26 N.Y. REv. BOOKS 22
(June 28, 1979). See generally Correspondence, 13 THE AM. SPECTATOR 39 (June

1980).
43. Pugsley, supra note 4, at 395-97.
44. See notes 84-93 infra and accompanying text.
45. 428 U.S. at 240 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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general justification for a system of punishment, and as a basis for
general and specific determinations about the nature and degree of

punishments that offenders should receive. 46 He thus found retribution an inadequate basis on which to justify capital punishment.

The plurality's discussion of deterrence, the second major penal rationale in support of capital punishment, is also brief, but

more cogent than its treatment of retribution. In sum, both the
plurality47 and hard-liners 48 found the evidence concerning the deterirent effect of capital punishment inconclusive, and for that reason found no basis on which to declare the death penalty
unconstitutional. Justice Marshall, having spent considerable time
analyzing the data unfavorable to the deterrence argument in
Furman,4 9 in Gregg felt compelled to refute the more favorable

study done by Isaac Ehrlich. 50 Acute methodological criticisms of
Ehrlich's work abound, 5 1 and after reviewing them, Marshall concluded that "capital punishment is not necessary as a deterrent to
52
crime in our society."

DETERRENCE

Concerning the utilitarian theory of deterrence, it is most rea-

sonable to demur. The claims on behalf of execution's marginally
superior deterrent value over other forms of criminal punishment

have never been satisfactorily demonstrated, nor, for a variety of
methodologically intractable reasons, 53 are they likely to be. This
46. Id. at 237 (Marshall, J., dissenting); note 66 infra.
47. 428 U.S. at 184-87.
48. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 354-56 (1976) (White, J., dissenting).
49. 408 U.S. at 347-54 (Marshall, J., concurring).
50. Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life
and Death, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 397 (1975).
51. E.g., Bowers & Pierce, The Illusion of Deterrence in Isaac Ehrlich's Research on Capital Punishment, 85 YALE L.J. 187 (1975); Passell, The Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty: A Statistical Test, 28 STAN. L. REv. 61 (1975).
52. 428 U.S. at 236 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 353 (Marshall, J.,

dissenting)).
53. See, e.g., C. BLACK, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: 25-27 (1974).

[Aifter all possible inquiry, including the probing of all possible methods of
inquiry, we do not know, and for systematic and easily visible reasons cannot know, what the truth about this 'deterrent' effect may be ....
The inescapable flaw is .

.

. that social conditions in any state are not

constant through time, and that social conditions are not the same in any two
states. If an effect were observed (and the observed effects, one way or another, are not large) then one could not at all tell whether any of this effect
is attributable to the presence or absence of capital punishment. A
'scientific'-that is to say, a soundly based-conclusion is simply impossible,
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conclusion is shared by most thoughtful students of the subject on
either side of the debate 54 and is reflected most recently in both
the plurality5 5 and hard-line 56 opinions of the United States Su-

preme Court in the Gregg series of cases in 1976. But despite or
because of such inconclusiveness, both groups of Justices and some
commentators find warrant for continued imposition of the punishment. They thus accord constitutional sanction to the exchange of a
known quantity-the life of the condemned-for what they themselves acknowledge to be a speculative return. To do so is to approve a starkly utilitarian stance whose logic places the collective
interest above justice in the individual case and displays a willingness to employ even extreme and irrevocable measures to that
end. 57 According to this view, the burden of proof on the issue of
deterrent value appropriately rests with the abolitionists, and thus
the indefinite empirical uncertainty concerning deterrence forms
the basis for continuing the practice. 58 That is, any and all doubt
must be resolved in favor of the state, not the individual. Only a
moral theory which places no or negligible value on individual human life-albeit criminally guilty human life-could embrace such
an upended starting premise. Naked utilitarian calculus fits that
description, assumes the morality of the death penalty, and insists upon that distribution of the burden of persuasion. In such a
construction of the argument, the abolitionists are predestined to
lose; for, according to retentionists of this persuasion, deterrence is
the primary justification for capital punishment, and the less that
is known about its effects, the stronger the case for continued
execution.
and no methodological path out of this tangle suggests itself.
Id. at 25-26.
54. The work of Isaac Ehrlich seems to be the only empirical defense of the
proposition that execution-as distinguished from merely the latent availability of
the death penalty-possesses marginally superior deterrent value over other severe
punishments for murder. Ehrlich, supra note 50. Ehrlich's assumptions, analyses,

and conclusions have all been attacked in a new round of critical literature sparked
by publication of his article. See e.g., Bowers & Pierce, supra note 51; Passell, supra
note 51. Only those utilitarian retentionists who were already committed to the idea
of the death penalty's marginally greater deterrence now find their beliefs satisfactorily vindicated on the basis of Professor Ehrlich's studies. See, e.g., van den Haag,
The Collapse of the Case Against Capital Punishment, 30 NAT'L REV. 395, 402-04
(March 31, 1978).
55. See cases cited note 28 supra.
56. See cases cited note 29 supra.
57. See, e.g., van den Haag, supra note 54.
58. See, e.g., van den Haag, supra note 18. Contra, Bedau, supra note 18.
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Even if we could know with some degree of assurance that a
particular and superior deterrent value could be obtained from
executing rather than incarcerating, that would not settle the question for any but these committed utilitarians. The morally principled objection would remain that one cannot do that which is
otherwise wrong merely to achieve a concededly worthy goal. More
familiarly, the ends cannot justify the means. The limits to deterrence, and hence to the punishments that may be imposed on an
individual criminal in order to achieve it, are highly elastic both in
theory and practice. There is no a priori ceiling to the price that a
utilitarian society would feel justified in exacting from a criminal if
that price were thought to be capable of realizing the greatest
amount of collective happiness (aggregate utility).,59 Indeed, as
commentators have pointed out,60 there is no requirement in deterrence theory that the person punished for purposes of example be
guilty. It is enough if the public, to whom the deterrent message is being communicated, thinks him so. Thus justice and individual desert are at fundamental odds with utility and collective
benefit.
IRETRIBUTIVISM

Kant expressed his classical conception of retributivism in
morally absolutist terms. 61 His insistence upon the moral primacy
of the individual forms the underlying basis for his subsequent
discussion of the rights and duties of that individual in a moral
community of fellow human beings. An individual's dignity, according to Kant, derives from his or her capacity for rationality and its
employment in the search for truth.6 2 The individual has, innately,
59. Rule utilitarians have attempted to counter this objection with the observation that a system that openly relied on such practice would soon reach a quite inutile point of diminishing returns. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY
11-13 (1968). But would not such a system take precaution against having the injustice discovered precisely in order to preserve its efficacy? Further, such a defense

contemplates only illegal undeserved sanctions; what of undeserved sanctions that
are legal, such as excessive sentences, or vicarious punishment? Finally, and by definition, utility of whatever variety has its price: In extreme cases, involving national

security for example, where the cost-benefit calculus tips heavily in favor of sacrificing the innocent, the utilitarian could consistently opt for sacrificial, illegal, and
undeserved punishment. See Ezorsky, Ethics of Punishment, in PHILOSOPHICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT XV-xvii (G. Ezorsky ed. 1972).
60. See, e.g., Ezorsky, supra note 59, at xvii.
61. I. KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 55-113 (H.J.
Paton trans. 1964).

62. Id.
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the freedom necessary for choice, and thus the responsibility for
choices made rests properly with him. In this, he can be said to
possess moral desert. This moral capacity, this freedom, makes of
the individual a moral actor, a subject, an end in himself who may
not justly be dealt with as merely an object or means to another's
63
ends.
With reference to the unique punishment of death, we are
considering the sine qua non of "human dignity"-and of every
other positive human quality-the continued existence of life itself.
The very efficacy claimed for death as a punishment inheres in the
importance we attach to life's preservation. If there is a right to life
(as I believe), it is certainly at stake in the argument over capital
punishment. And if the Kantian notion of "human dignity" remains
unsatisfactorily vague as an explanation for that asserted right's preciousness, perhaps the purposes of this Article are sufficiently
served by emphasis on that morally intuitive valuation of life itself
which has traditionally been a shared societal value.
The individual has, in the community of her fellows, reciprocally corresponding rights and obligations of noninterference with
the rights and freedoms of all others. This morallpolitical community (civitas) exists to provide a skeletal framework within which
the collectivity of individual rights and freedoms can be protected.
Law, for Kant, is the community's unchangeable ordering mechanism; and the community's legal apparatus, the state, is to be inflexible in its application. Positive law exists only as a partial embodiment of the moral law among human beings.64
If an individuars behavior violates another's rights, the transgressor has thereby gained an unjust advantage at the expense both
of the victim and the community as a whole. This creates a moral
disequilibrium, an imbalance in the scales of justice which must be
rectified by imposing a corresponding disadvantage on the offender. 65 In so doing, the community is penalizing conduct by which
the individual has illegitimately threatened the consensual foun63.

This account of Kant's general approach to criminal punishment is drawn

primarily from I. KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 98-109, 131-33

(J. Ladd trans. 1965). For an excellent and concise account of both Kantian and Hegelian classical retributivism, see E. PINCOFFS, THE RATIONALE OF LEGAL PUNISHMENT 2-16 (1966).

64. I. KANT, supra note 63, at 98-109.
65. Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 MONIST 475, 477-80 (1968). Of course,
the disadvantage must not be incommensurately severe, or the scales of justice
would be further imbalanced. See I. KANT, supra note 63, at 101.
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dation of a rule and rule system which exists for the benefit of all
community members, 66 including the offender herself. Thus one of
the premises of a humane retributive disadvantaging is the con67
tinuing relationship of the offender with her (offended) community.
The adjudication-and-disadvantaging process is, in the Kantian
retributivist view, a good thing. Not only does it assign appropriate
disadvantage to the offender, but it also reiterates her obligation to
respect the rights of others. This moral component exceeds the re66. There is a distinction to be noted here. The formation and maintenance of a
social order along the lines of moral contractarian principles is one thing, while the
preservation and aggrandizement of any social order at whatever cost is another. See
J. RAWLS, supra note 39, at 251-57 for a suggestive interpretation of how Kant's
autonomous and rational beings would freely will the principles of justice chosen by
those in Rawls' original position. Contra, T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 229-36 (M.
Oakeshott ed. 1962). Though the system-stabilizing effects of deonotological
retributivism might resemble those of teleological deterrence, the substantive moral
principles and procedures used to apply them will, or should, differ significantly.
The relevance of this point to criminal punishment, including capital punishment, is the following: While many grant retributivism a central role in deciding
whom to punish (only the guilty), they refuse that theory any place in justifying the
general institution and systematic practice of punishment, including the determination of kinds and amounts of punishment. Rather, they arrogate the latter function to
the utilitarian theory of general prevention (deterrence plus normal socialization).
H.L.A. HAuRT, supra note 59, at 2-13; Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3

(1955).
But utility tells us nothing about the kind of social order that is being protected,
whereas the Kantian moral theory which informs retributivism does. The institution
of criminal justice and its sanctions should be an integral part of the larger social order in which it operates, not divorced from or indifferent to the social, economic, or
ethical values and practices of that society. See A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE
143-49 (1976); Marx, Capital Punishment, in MARX AND ENGELS 485-89 (L. Feuer
ed. 1959); Murphy, Marxism and Retribution, 2 PHILOSOPHY & PUB. AFF. 217
(1973).
In short, advocacy of a retributivist justification for a system of criminal punishment as well as the imposition of particular punishments on specific offenders requires for consistency the evolution of a nonutilitarian social order. It may well be
that efforts to achieve the part will result in the evolution of the whole: Criminal justice forging a link with the larger matrix of social justice is quite different from the
unreflective use of state force to preserve an unjust status quo. While the function of
any system of criminal punishment may thus at one level always appear to be consequentialist (conservative of social order), not every variant of consequentialism is
utilitarian.
67. It should be made clear that this point, which is later developed at greater
length in an analogy to civil disobedience, see note 74 infra and accompanying text,
is my own, and represents a departure from Kant. Indeed, Kant has some very
troubling things to say concerning the status of a convicted offender; statements that
on the surface appear to contradict his assertions concerning the dignity of man and
his admonition never to treat a human being merely as a means, but always as an end
in his or her own right. For a discussion of these seeming inconsistencies, see id.
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quirements of mere penalty (pragmatic disadvantage) 68 and illustrates what Professor Feinberg terms "the expressive function of
punishment." 6 9 In this view, by definition, "punishment" adds to
whatever penalty might be imposed, another, morally censorious
element: social reprobation. Each of these analytically separable
70
components raises justificatory questions for penal practice.
The only basis of justification for imposing criminal punishment according to retributivism is moral desert: that which can be
said to have been earned or merited by the willed behavior of a responsible individual. The principle of desert provides a coherent,
morally acceptable reason for responding to a committed offense
with punishment. The behavior that warrants punishment is that
which transgresses the morally informed positive law. 71 The concept of desert is what critically distinguishes principled punishment
from that imposed according to the dictates of utility. As C. S.
Lewis has put it: "[T]he concept of desert is the only connecting
link between punishment and justice. It is only72 as deserved or
undeserved that a sentence can be just or unjust."
According to Kant, punishment cannot be inflicted for some
questionable goal or to "promote some other good ... for a human
being can never be manipulated merely as a means to the purposes
of someone else." 73 This stricture raises immediate and obvious difficulties for a punishment scheme, namely, deterrence, grounded
on utilitarianism, especially with reference to the death penalty.
For it expresses fundamental objection to using the offender's situation as the opportunity for doing anything more (or less) than justice in his case. Justice is to be concerned exclusively with acts

68. I. KANT, supra note 63, at 99-102, 132 n.3; Pilon, Criminal Remedies: Restitution, Punishment, or Both?, 88 ETHICS 348 (1978).
69. J. FEINBERG, DoING AND DESERVING 95-118 (1970). Again, this moral condemnation explains what punishment does; it does not justify it. See note 42 supra
and accompanying text. Further, this "expressive function" of punishment is more
than, and different from, the unreflective acceptance of the society's expression of
will on the matter of appropriate punishment. See notes 38-40, 42-46 supra and accompanying text.
70. J. FEINBERG, supra note 69, at 98.
71. I. KANT, supra note 63, at 100. This corresponds to the principle of legality
cherished by most nontotalitarian legal systems; nullum crimen, nulla poena sine
lege (no crime or punishment unless there has first been a transgression of a promulgated law).
72. Lewis, The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, 6 RES JuDICATAE 224,
225 (1953).
73. I. KANT, supra note 63, at 100.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1981

13

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 5 [1981], Art. 7
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9:1501

past, and it is on this basis solely that the individual could be
judged and sentenced.
Revenge is clearly not the purpose of Kantian retributivism.
Revenge is a blind, retaliatory urge to inflict pain for pain suffered.
It respects neither persons nor principles, while retributivism respects both. Revenge seeks arbitrary enforcement of a private
claim. 74 Retributivism assays justice in the individual case and reaffirms the community's rights and rule system while so doing.
The kind and amount of punishment to be imposed are inextricably linked to penal purpose and have been the source of equal
concern. What, specifically, of the death penalty under Kant's formulation of retributivism? Proceeding from the image of the
imbalanced scales, Kant holds that the "principle of equality" determines both the kind and degree of punishment. 75 As applied to
murder, this principle requires that capital punishment be inflicted
on the offender, because "[tlhere is no sameness of kind between
death and remaining alive even under the most miserable condi76
tions."
This approach exemplifies Kant's ideal scheme of punishments-namely, that punishments be exactingly proportioned to
the gravity of the offense and the moral deserts of the offender.
Based upon this same notion, retributivism would rule out capital
punishment for any crime less than murder. The "principle of
equality" demands rigid application of the lex talionis, a part often
mistaken for the whole of retributivism.
There are convincing arguments for the impossibility of
achieving anything close to such a finely calibrated punishment
scheme. In order to determine truly the moral desert of the offender, one would have to reconstruct his biography, and be privy
to the complex of motives which resulted in the offense for which
he has been convicted. Professor Feinberg concludes:
Certainly, there is no rational way of demonstrating that one
criminal deserves exactly twice or three-eighths or twelve-ninths
as much suffering as another; yet, according to at least some
forms of this theory [retributivism], the amounts of suffering inflicted for any two crimes should stand in exact proportion to the
"amounts" of wickedness in the criminals. 77
74. See id. at 101.
75. Id. at 101.
76. Id. at 102.
77.

J. FEINBERG, supra note 69, at 117.
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It would seem that Kant's own ambitious requirements for the
practical determination of moral desert (including that, presumably, for murder) do not admit of being fulfilled.
The relevant distinction here is between adherence to the absolutist moral foundation of Kantian retributivism (as expressed in
the Second Formulation of the Categorical Imperative), 7 8 and the
degree of latitude that should exist in the legislative and juridical
spheres in determining the appropriate Oust) punishment for a particular offense. 79 The worth of a human life, based on the concepts
of rationality, freedom, and human dignity, is absolute and unchanging. The approach of the positive law in reflecting these moral concepts, within limits that do not violate them, can change. 8 0 In the
Kantian view of John Rawls, for example, the state (in the absence
of a rigidly drawn blueprint) must accord superiority to the individual's most important rights-including, of course, the right to life
-over the collective interests of the community. Professor Rawls
states:
Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that
even the welfare of the society as a whole cannot override. For
this reason justice denies that the loss of freedom for some is
made right by a greater good shared by others. It does not allow
that the sacrifices imposed on a few are outweighed by the
larger sum of advantages enjoyed by many.81
This leads back to, and is connected with, a more complete
consideration of Kant's valuation of the individual in his stricture
against punishment that would violate that worth. In addition to
rendering impracticable the determination of the exact penalty required, Kant's "principle of equality" would also frequently lead to
unjustifiable results by having the punishment simulate the kind
of offense for which it is being imposed. He himself acknowledges as much with specific reference to rape and pederasty because
the punishments "would themselves be punishable crimes against
humanity in general." 8 2 These same considerations demand that
even a convicted murderer not be subjected to any responsive
treatment by society that would degrade his character as a human
78.

I. KANT, supra note 61, at 96.

79. See note 91 infra and accompanying text.
80. B. AUNE, KANT'S THEORY OF MORALS 160-69 (1979); I. KANT, supra note
61, at 41-42.
81. J. Rawls, supra note 39, at 2-3.
82.

I. KANT, supra note 63, at 132.
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being. 8 3 One would thus be unjustified, presumably, in doing what
the "principle of equality" would otherwise dictate: modeling a
"cold-blooded" murderer's execution (assuming such were possible)
on the exact lines of his victim's grisly death. Even the most humane execution imaginable cannot be viewed as anything but degrading. Yet Kant clearly insists upon death for murder,8 4 upon
a literal operation of the biblical lex talionis in relation to that
one punishment which uniquely threatens the offender as an end
in himself and irrevocably eliminates the possibility of his human

dignity.
In symbolic terms, capital punishment is ostracization to the
ultimate degree. It not only emphatically transgresses the inviolability of the executed, but also insuperably destroys those bonds of
community which criminal punishment should strive to reaffirm.
Many have long recognized that the demoralization of the convicted awaiting execution is largely attributable to just this factor
inherent in the death penalty. It should not go unnoticed by
retributivists that some utilitarian advocates of capital punishment
have recognized precisely this element as an argument in support
of the death penalty. 85
The foregoing lines of objection already strongly suggest the
form of an alternative retributivist conclusion regarding capital
punishment. Chiefly, of course, there is the respect required for
the individual's dignity and moral capacity (and, by logical necessity, his or her life). It is difficult in theory and impossible in practice to reconcile such respect with the practice of execution. Professor Gerstein has put it succinctly:
Perhaps the people involved in the ceremony surrounding the
public beheading of a nobleman in the eighteenth century could
continue to have profound respect for him as a moral being. [In
fact, Kant used such an execution as an example in his work.]
But ceremonial public executions would not be tolerated among
us today. Given our surreptitious and mechanical approach to
execution [a point taken up at length by Camus in his polemic,
"Reflections on the Guillotine"], it is hard to see that the condemned are treated as anything more than 'objects to be . . .
discarded.' . . . It is not the degree of suffering which might
lead a retributivist to regard capital punishment as cruel and un83. Id. at 102.
84. Id.
85.

See, e.g., E. VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS 211-12 (1975).
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usual, but its dehumanizing character, its total negation of the
moral worth of the person to be executed. 86

An alternative response to a convicted murderer, for example,

would be to impose appropriately harsh punishment of definite duration (up to and including, possibly, a life term) as opposed to execution. In addition to the individual's capacity for morality which
Kant emphasizes, Rawls maintains that, at least theoretically, a
convict retains the capacity for justice notwithstanding its conspicuous absence at the time she committed her offense. 8 7 This capac-

ity, shared by all members of the community, is another of the
bonds that require maintenance in the face of a violation of the
community's rights. Whether a community suspends observance of

these values as to a murderer-who clearly presents the ultimate
provocation and the strongest inducement to such suspension
-might almost be regarded as a test of the community's commit-

ment to these values, and its estimation of their true worth. The
French sociologist, Durkheim, told us that we need our criminals
to reinforce our sense of right and wrong.8 8 We also need them to
reinforce our principles of justice and our expressed ideals.
89
The maintenance of bonds which, in contradistinction to Kant,

86. Gerstein, Capital Punishment--"Crueland Unusual"?: A Retributivist Response, 85 ETHICS 75, 78-79 (1974) (footnote omitted). I wish gratefully to acknowledge Professor Gerstein's article as my initial source of inspiration for an alternative
humane retributivist approach to capital punishment. He in turn, credits W.
MOBERLY, THE ETHICS OF PUNISHMENT (1968); Murphy, Three Mistakes About
Retributivism, 31 ANALYSIS 166 (1971). Gerstein, supra, at 76 n.5.
87. See Rawls, The Sense of Justice, 72 PHIL. REV. 281 (1963).
88.

E. DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 70-110 (G. Simpson

trans. 1965).
89. Kant's own view of the offender's status during the time of his punishment
is a conspicuous departure from the regard which he otherwise insists inures to the
dignity of the individual person. The following passage thus merits quotation in full:
No human being in the state can indeed be without any position of dignity at all, inasmuch as he has at least that dignity adhering to a citizen. The
only exception is someone who has lost it by his own criminal act, in which
case, although he is allowed to stay alive, he is made into a mere tool of the
will of someone else (either of the state or of another citizen). Such a person
(and he can become one only through judgment and Law) is a slave .. . and
is owned by someone else.... The latter is, therefore, not merely his master
... but also his owner... being his owner, he can sell or alienate him as a
thing, can use him as he pleases (but not for ignominious purposes), and can
dispose of his abilities and energies ... although not of his life or limbs.
I. KANT, supra note 63, at 98.
These views are difficult to reconcile with Kant's oft-quoted admonition not to
treat the individual merely as a means to someone else's purposes, id. at 100, be-
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is advocated here, might be likened to the relationship between the
individual and the state under the classical understanding of civil
disobedience. Significantly, the transgression there is principled,
intentionally public, and dedicated to the reformation or removal of
the particular law(s) being broken-elements not present in a corncause "[h]is innate personality [that is, his right as a person] protects him against
such treatment, even though he may indeed be condemned to lose his civil personality." Id. at 100 (brackets in original). And they further appear at odds with his caution to the authorities concerning the treatment even of one condemned to die: "But
the death of a criminal must be kept entirely free of any maltreatment that would
make an abomination of the humanity residing in the person suffering it." Id. at 102
(emphasis added).
There is at least one other statement, pregnant with ominous possibility, that
comports with the dark views quoted at length above. That is: "[The offender] must
first be found to be deserving of punishment before any consideration is given to the
utility of this punishment for himself or for his fellow citizens." Id. at 100 (emphasis
added). The "before" hardly gives the offender distinctive assurance in any principled system of legal punishment. Only the behavioristic proposals of Lady Wooton
and those similarly committed to the vision of a therapeutic state would sweep away
the notion of moral/legal guilt before the full panoply of utilitarian goals and methods could be unleashed upon the individual. It is precisely at the moment of conviction and thereafter that the offender is most in need of all the antiutilitarian force
that retributive punishment theory can provide. Before conviction, the state has no
warrant whatsoever to do anything to or with the defendant for its (or, allegedly, the
defendant's) benefit except to accord him or her due process in the investigation and
adjudication of the case. But this wide opening that Kant provides the state in the
passages quoted above, id. at 98, 100, respectively, is mirrored also in the very
wording of the admonition mentioned earlier: "[A] human being can never be manipulated merely as a means to the purposes of someone else ..
" Id. at 100 (emphasis added). Much could be done to an offender without running afoul of the proscription contained in such a loose qualifier as "merely," and-if any reconciliation
at all is to be made between the opposing sets of passages above-it seems that that
word provides the path. Yet that is surely a technical and unsatisfying explanation for
what stands out as an inconsistency in spirit between Kant's general notions of moral
valuation for the rational being and these prescriptions for the exercise of state
power, so as to undermine severely, if not entirely negate, the dignity and worth of
the individual convict.
Though a full exploration of these questions cannot, obviously, be pursued here,
I wish at least to renounce unequivocally the dehumanizing, crudely totalitarian implications that one might read into the troubling passages quoted above. Instead, in
the text of this Article, I formulate my own implications of retributivist punishment
theory insofar as the offender's relationship to the society and its state are concerned.
And the appropriately modified analogy of the ordinary offender's status to that of a
principled civil disobedient is similarly my own. In addition to the passages above,
declaring the offender out of the community for the duration of his or her sentence,
Kant explicitly condemned the idea of civil disobedience. Id. at 138-41. The larger
political theory, of which I view retributivism as an important and legal component,
would not exclude such an important avenue for moral dissent against putatively unjust positive law. The absence of such an avenue either conflates the realms of law
and morality, or renders impotent the objections of the latter to the perceived injustices of the former.
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mon offense. Yet, while the authorities may, and morally should,
take cognizance of the moral differences between civil disobedience
and the common offense, they are officially obliged to notice only
the illegality. This is not amiss in a generally democratic state,
since a variable standard of cognizance might result in unjustifiably
harsh treatment at the hands of authorities unsympathetic to the
aims of the civil disobedients; and unjustifiably lenient treatment at
the hands of authorities sympathetic to, say, wife-killing. Civil disobedients fully expect the appropriate punishment and endure it not
only to validate thereby the moral basis of their claim, but also to
give symbolic witness to their continuing relationship with the political community. Not only do the underlying bonds remain unbroken, they are actively reaffirmed: The offenders maintain their
ties to the very community against which their transgressions were
directed.
With appropriate modifications, a similar relationship can be
seen in the case of a convicted murderer. Even if he is sentenced
to a life term without possibility of parole, he retains his membership in the community, and has had that status reaffirmed by the
process of adjudication and punishment. His formal bond with the
community is the punishment bond. It is that which signifies the
community's recognition of him as a responsible moral agent and
deserving of its respect, expressed of necessity through penalty and
censure. He in turn accepts, if only tacitly, his punishment as
justified; he acknowledges that he ought to feel guilty and suffer for
his violative behavior. In the instance of the life term, particularly,
there is this paradox: The community has "cared enough to give
the very worst" punishment which, by abolishing the death penalty, it has permitted itself to impose.
It might be objected at this point that little if anything distinguishes the version of retributivism which I am proposing from the
sanctity-of-life theory and its programmatic expression through pacifism. In fact, retributivism neither depends upon nor requires adherence to that theory, although it does not preclude it.
While retributivism is informed and limited by the need to
protect life as the requisite for human dignity, it is at its core a
theory of justice, a justification of penal practice, a coherent principle of judgment concerning the appropriate sanction of convicted
criminals. 9 0 Insofar as an argument can be made for systematically
suspending imposition of death for capital crimes or eliminating the
90.

Gerstein, supra note 86, at 77.
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availability of the punishment altogether, it is made by appealing
to a source more fundamental than retributivism's traditional system of reckoning. Rather, that argument appeals to retributivism's
spirit and Kant's own system of moral theory, to its reservoir of
moral intuition and sense of larger purpose not to violate but to
transcend its own strict logic. It asks whether it is appropriate, in
espousing human dignity and the value of life, to violate them
-even if deservedly so. It suggests that maybe the only crime that
could justify the death penalty is, under the only moral theory that
could justify imposition of such a penalty, still not enough to bring
such a terrible instrument into play. The argument here is not
that the murderer may not justly deserve to die. Rather, the question is: Must the theory of just desert provide and deliver that
unique, life-extinguishing punishment, even to the erosion of primary community values which it is assigned to protect?91
91. There are textual bases in Kant's own work on which to base this departure
from a literal application of the lex talionis. In the first place, his classification of the
severity of particular forms of crime is, as would be expected in any formulation of
positive law, temporal- and culture-bound. He specifically, for example, cites two
types of murder "with regard to which it still remains doubtful whether legislation is
authorized to impose the death penalty .... The first crime is infanticide 'of an illegitimate baby' at the hands of the mother.., the other is the murder of a fellow soldier ... in a duel." I. KANT, supra note 63, at 106 (parentheticals omitted). The essence of Kant's analysis is to pit the prevalent customary notions of individual honor
against the claims of the categorical imperative concerning the legal justice of punishment for crimes that merit death. He concludes that while the imperative remains
constant, the state of existing legislation will of necessity reflect society's imperfect
sense of justice, as affected by competing ideas of personal honor. While Kant sees
this as an imperfect and temporary situation, I argue that changing conceptions of
human decency in the exercise of the state's undoubted authority to administer punishment ought to be reflected in our criminal-justice system and be susceptible of incorporation within the contours of retributivist theory. While Kant waited patiently
for the societal attitude to encompass a greater range of capital cases, may we not, in
a different era, note their steady constriction and hope for their eventual elimination?
In a later passage, Kant explains that the literal punishments for rape and pederasty would themselves be crimes against humanity in general and hence are inappropriate to impose. He concludes that section of his exposition with this suggestive
statement:
The only time a criminal cannot complain that he is treated unjustly is when
he draws the evil deed back onto himself [as a punishment] and when he
suffers that which according to the spirit of the penal law-even if not to the
letter thereof-is the same as what he has inflicted on others.
I. KANT, supra note 63, at 133 (brackets in original) (footnote omitted). At the very
least, this seems to provide valid precedent, even within Kant's own strict system,
for certain exceptions to a rule of literal equality between crime and punishment.
The time has come when death should be counted among the ranks of proscribed
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There would be nothing in principle contradictory about an
anti-capital-punishment retributivist qua retributivist engaging in a
just war; or procuring, performing, or undergoing an abortion. The
respectively surrounding arguments of legitimate national defense,
and the special nature of fetal existence as distinguished from an
unquestionably recognizable human being with rights of autonomy
(to name but two possible lines of reasoning) are not foreclosed to
the retributivist on grounds of his or her retributivism.
These positions are off limits, however, to the strong sanctityof-life theorist, for the core of his belief is the preservation and
protection, under all circumstances, of human life at whatever
stage. His primary agenda is life protection, not justice. The logic
of his position could never consistently admit of or condone capital
punishment. For the retributivist, biological existence is the floor
of human dignity, not its ceiling. That existence, for the sanctity-oflife theorist, is everything.
How, it will be asked, will appropriate punishment be determined under the alternative retributivist system? What will substitute for the admittedly impracticable workings of the lex talionis?
What is first needed is a broader understanding of the lex as guide,
not calibrator. Various writers have suggested appropriate directions in which to proceed. One retributivist would draw the line
against "cruel and unusual" punishment in terms of the kind of
punishment and not (within rational limits) the degree. 92 The logic
of retributivism and the evolving standards by which the eighth
amendment is interpreted would seem to require constraints on
93
both.
Justice Brennan eloquently drew the nation's attention to the
essence of the "cruel and unusual" concept in these excerpts from
his concurring opinion in Furman:
[Cruel and unusual punishments are those which] treat members
of the human race as nonhumans; as objects to be toyed with
and discarded. They are thus inconsistent with the fundamental
premise of the Clause that even the vilest criminal remains a hu94
man being possessed of common human dignity.
punishments. Pugsley, Capital Punishment: Bringing Back Death, 103 COMMONWEAL 518 (1976); see notes 82-88 supra and accompanying text.
92. Gerstein, supra note 86, at 78.
93. E.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 173; Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. at 101.
94. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 272-73 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis

added).
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The primary principle [by which we may determine
whether a particular punishment is "cruel and unusual"] which I
believe supplies the essential predicate for the application of the
must not by its severity
[other principles], is that a punishment
95
be degrading to human dignity.
In comparison to all other punishments today, then, the deliberate extinguishment of human life by the State is uniquely
96
degrading to human dignity.
Justice Brennan's final remark raises again the value of an historical
approach to law, one which permits and can constructively guide
change that is morally desirable.
The expressive function of punishment generally suggests certain guidelines also. Professor Feinberg would thus replace the futile attempt at "equality theory" exactness with a theory of justice
which "demands that the condemnatory aspect of the punishment
suit the crime, that the crime be of a kind that is truly worthy of
reprobation." 9 7 The degree of disapproval would "fit" the crime in
rough fashion: The more serious crimes would receive more serious disapproval, with an offense's seriousness measured by the
nonmetaphysical standard of "[t]he amount of harm it generally
causes and the degree to which people are disposed to commit
it. "98

This reprobative approach has the not inconsiderable value of
making the society reconsider its own estimation of the seriousness
of certain behaviors and the declared severity of some punishments. Not everything that is immoral deserves to be made illegal;
and not everything that is illegal deserves serious punishment.
Deciding which conduct does puts both the authorities and all
other community members on notice concerning the relative disapproval attached to various behaviors. And though in practice both
the penalty and reprobation components of punishment are merged
in a prison sentence (our society's archetypal punishment), their
separate consideration for analytical and policymaking purposes is
most worthwhile.
The severity of the penalty for murder will, then, be propor95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 281 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
Id. at 291 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
J. FEINBERG, supra note 69, at 118.
Id.
R. GAROFALO, CIMINOLOGY 241-42 (Millar trans. 1914).
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tional to the gravity of the offense-in a reprobative way. The penalty need not (and in this example, should not) inflict the same
physical suffering as the offense did. The quantum of condemnation
must be commensurate with the offense; the actual penalty need
not be exactly equal.
This approach comports well with Garofalo's famous reminder
that "[t]he mere deprivation of liberty . . .is undeniably punishment," 99 a sentiment heartily echoed by modem theorists of imprisonment in their call for humane conditions in which the convict
might serve his time (undergo his deserved punishment). 10 0
If the version of retributivism which I am suggesting, and its
conclusion regarding capital punishment cause injustice, then it is
an injustice on the side of life, one which achieves the larger purposes of the very theory that might so label it. I do not believe,
however, that the preservation of human life results in such injustice or contradiction.
100.

See, e.g., N. MoRRis, THE FrrunRE OF IMPRISONMENT 1-57 (1974).
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